Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 13

Number 2

Article 3

6-1-2015

Leaving Dumb Phones Behind: A Commentary on the Warrantless
Searches of Smartphone Data Granted in R. v. Fearon
Jordan Fine

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cjlt
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law Commons,
Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jordan Fine, "Leaving Dumb Phones Behind: A Commentary on the Warrantless Searches of Smartphone
Data Granted in R. v. Fearon" (2015) 13:2 CJLT.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Canadian Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Schulich Law
Scholars. For more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Leaving Dumb Phones Behind: A Commentary on the
Warrantless Searches of Smartphone Data Granted in
R. v. Fearon
Jordan Fine*
Given the incredible rate of smartphone technological evolution, is it about time
the Supreme Court of Canada devised a special test to give law enforcement agents
significantly more power to search through phone data without a warrant upon
arrest of a suspect? In R. v. Fearon, the majority did just that. But this article
argues the opposite is true: the increasing potential for immense privacy
infringements when police search powerful and constantly evolving technological
devices demands a greater limitation to police powers.
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has agreed with the position that limitations
are needed concerning computers. Additionally, the weaknesses in law enforcement
procedure described by the majority are already served sufficiently by existing
principles which do not infringe Canadians’ Charter rights. Future cases should
distinguish the majority decision for these reasons and recognize the thoughtful and
practical dissent. Otherwise, there is a danger that this unreasonable expansion of
police power to search citizens, combined with anticipated technological evolution in
both smartphones and government surveillance initiatives, will have a corrosive
effect on the freedom guaranteed to Canadians by section 8 of the Charter.
It is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive
of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal computer . . .
Computers often contain our most intimate correspondence. They
contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal situations.
They even reveal our specific interests, likes, and propensities,
recording in the browsing history and cache files the information we
seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the Internet.
R. v. Morelli, Fish J.1
Although historically cellular telephones were far more restricted than
computers in terms of the amount and kind of information that they
could store, present day phones have capacities that are, for our
purposes, equivalent to those of computers . . . In these reasons, then,
when I referred to ‘‘computers”’, I include within that term the cellular
telephone.
R. v. Vu, Cromwell J.2

*
1

2

JD Candidate 2017, Osgoode Hall Law School.
R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, 2010 CarswellSask 150, 2010 CarswellSask 151, [2010] 1
S.C.R. 253, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8 (S.C.C.) at para 2 [Morelli].
R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, 2013 CarswellBC 3342, 2013 CarswellBC 3343, [2013] 3 S.C.R.
657, [2013] S.C.J. No. 60 (S.C.C.) at para 38 [Vu].
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Fearon3 devised an exception giving
law enforcement agents significantly more power to search cell phones upon the
arrest of a suspect, a decision both peculiar and alarming. The exception is
peculiar because it was developed after a flurry of recent jurisprudence which
acknowledged the profundity of privacy infringement when police search
powerful technological devices. It is alarming because, if followed, it gives law
enforcement a right of way through the Charter’s protection of privacy interests,
directly into the private lives of Canadians. Moreover, the exception grants
power to law enforcement where sufficient and appropriate authority to search
cell phones already existed. Future cases should distinguish Fearon for these
reasons and recognize Justice Karakatsanis’s thoughtful and practical dissent.
Otherwise, there is a grave danger that this unreasonable expansion of police
power to search citizens, combined with anticipated technological evolution in
both smartphones and government surveillance initiatives, will have a corrosive
effect on the freedom promised to Canadians by Section 8 of the Charter.

I. A CURSORY OVERVIEW
(a) The Peculiar Facts
Two men, one armed (allegedly Kevin Fearon), robbed a jewellery merchant.
They were arrested, but the handgun and loot eluded police. Immediately upon
arrest, Fearon’s phone was searched. The officer, Sergeant Hicks, ‘‘‘had a look
through the cell phone, saw some things in that cell phone, and seized it at that
point in time as evidence in relation to the investigation.’”4 Hicks testified that
while he did not recall specifics, ‘‘[h]e was looking to see if there was any evidence
that might be on there, so he could take it under control for himself or to let
somebody else know who may be doing the investigation that there are things on
that phone that may be related to their ongoing investigation.”5 The police found
photos of the elusive ‘‘smoking gun” as well as a draft text referring to jewellery
with the self-incriminating words ‘‘[w]e did it.”6
Despite his criminal incompetence and likely guilt, Fearon is, as a Canadian,
still entitled to protection from unreasonable search and seizure as set out by
section 8 of the Charter.

3

4

5
6

R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, 2014 CarswellOnt 17202, 2014 CarswellOnt 17203, [2014] 3
S.C.R. 621, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77 (S.C.C.) [Fearon].
R. v. Fearon, 2010 ONCJ 645, 2010 CarswellOnt 10077, [2010] O.J. No. 5745 (Ont. C.J.)
at para 20, affirmed 2013 CarswellOnt 1703 (Ont. C.A.), affirmed 2014 CarswellOnt
17202, 2014 CarswellOnt 17203 (S.C.C.) [Fearon C.J.].
Ibid at para 21.
Ibid at para 24.
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(b) What Did the Court Do?
The issue in Fearon was framed as: ‘‘Does [the common law power enabling
police to search incident to a lawful arrest] permit the search of cell phones and
similar devices found on the suspect?”7 The answer should have been ‘‘yes and
no”—yes to the device, no to the data inside.8 The majority chose instead to
merely answer in the affirmative, and included limiting conditions that did not
differentiate between devices and data.
During the Court’s deliberations, the majority acknowledged that ‘‘the
search of a cell phone has the potential to be a much more significant invasion of
privacy than the typical search incident to arrest.”9 Yet, the majority’s response
to the question at issue inexplicably trivialized that potential. They set forth a
four-step approach allowing cell phone searches incident to an arrest (SITA)
under restrictive circumstances:
[A] search will comply with s. 8 where:
(1) The arrest was lawful;
(2) The search is truly incidental to the arrest in that the police have a reason
based on a valid law enforcement purpose to conduct the search, and that
reason is objectively reasonable. The valid law enforcement purposes in
this context are:
(a) Protecting the police, the accused, or the public;
(b) Preserving evidence; or
(c) Discovering evidence, including locating additional suspects, in situations in which the investigation will be stymied or significantly
hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone
incident to arrest;
(3) The nature and the extent of the search are tailored to the purpose of the
search; and
(4) The police take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device
and how it was searched.10
The potential erosion of the privacy protections promised to Canadians by
section 8 of the Charter is highlighted by the italicized passages above.
Investigations are inherently stymied where evidence exists, but is not
discovered. While it appears most investigations will meet these criteria, the
cost of being unable to acquire valuable evidence must be weighed against
privacy interests.
What does the Court mean by taking ‘‘detailed notes,” and how is it
regulated? Justice Cromwell details an obligation to ‘‘keep a careful record”
7
8

9
10

Fearon, supra note 3 at para 1.
Megan Savard & Rebecca McConchie, ‘‘Come Back with a Warrant: Why and How
Courts Should Protect our Privacy Interest in Digital Information” (2013) 34:4 For the
Defence.
Fearon, supra note 3 at para 58.
Ibid at para 83 [emphasis added].
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which includes ‘‘applications searched, the extent of the search, the time of the
search, its purpose and its duration.”11 Yet, this direction is general, nonexhaustive, and sets a low threshold of stymying an investigation, the
combination of which does not appear to serve as clarification for law
enforcement agents. It may be less evident from the facts of this case, but
consider that perfectly innocent citizens may be lawfully arrested on reasonable
and probable grounds.12 Despite such citizens’ innocence, the grounds for arrest
may effortlessly permit a search through their smartphone data under the Fearon
test.

(c) What Was the Majority’s Motive?
Though it may appear that Fearon’s patent guilt led the majority to
formalize the new test, this notion is quashed by both the Court’s holding that
the search infringed on Fearon’s rights, and in Justice Cromwell underlying
reasoning. Fearon’s appeal concerned arguments based on sections 8 and 24(2)
of the Charter, meaning if the Court established evidence taken from his phone
was done so in an unreasonable manner infringing his section 8 rights, that
evidence could be excluded from proceedings. The need to bypass that
infringement would explain why the majority crafted such an exception.
Nonetheless, they concluded that the search of Fearon’s phone did indeed
breach his section 8 rights.13
The underlying reasoning the majority offered for modification is shortsighted. Justice Cromwell’s explanation was that ‘‘a prompt search of a suspect’s
cell phone may serve important law enforcement objectives.” 14 While the virtue
in serving important law enforcement objectives is obvious, this explanation is
unsatisfactory. There are many paths to serving those objectives—the imposition
of constant surveillance on all citizens, for example. But surveillance states are
criticized precisely because the Charter demands that we balance law
enforcement objectives with privacy interests. For this reason, it is
unsurprising that Justice Karakatsanis leads her dissent by referencing George
Orwell’s 1984, as it encapsulates the need to limit developments which may serve
law enforcement, but whose adverse consequences far outweigh its benefits. 15
The modified test does not account for the obvious potential it has to infringe on
Canadians’ liberties.
Justice Cromwell’s test intends to help law enforcement, but overreaches at
the cost of infringing privacy, while also failing to serve its own purpose. The
expansion of police powers to do cursory searches of phones in SITAs is partially

11
12
13
14
15

Ibid at para 82.
Tim Quigley, ‘‘R. v. Fearon: A Problematic Decision” (2015) 15 C.R. (7th) 281.
Fearon, supra note 3 at paras 86-88.
Ibid at para 46.
Ibid at para 102, Karakatsanis J., dissenting.
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redundant to the existing doctrine of exigent circumstances, which allows a
desirable scope of power without significantly infringing privacy.
Before addressing the wealth of reasons to resist the panoptic-friendly
jurisprudence applied by the majority, I will let the Court itself explain why there
is such a high privacy interest at stake in smartphone searches.

II. THE SUPREME COURT. . .
(a) On Section 8 Searches and Privacy Interests
What makes this case an outlier is that the Supreme Court has recently dealt
with multiple cases where privacy rights and technology intersect.
To begin, a majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Cole confirmed that
employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their computers under
section 8. They explained:
Privacy is a matter of reasonable expectations. An expectation of
privacy will attract Charter protection if reasonable and informed
people in the position of the accused would expect privacy. If the
claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, s. 8 is engaged, and
the court must then determine whether the search or seizure was
reasonable.16

Once engaged, two opposing forces have stakes in section 8. The first is the
protection it affords Canadians’ liberties. Justice Cromwell recently described
privacy as ‘‘a prerequisite to individual security, self-fulfilment and autonomy as
well as to the maintenance of a thriving democratic society.”17 Undoubtedly, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that Charter protection against unreasonable
search and seizure is essential to our freedom.
The competing force is found in the language of section 8 and the use of the
word ‘‘unreasonable.” The prohibition against searches is not absolute—there
exists common law recognition that law enforcement agents can make SITAs. 18
16

17

18

R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, 2012 CarswellOnt 12684, 2012 CarswellOnt 12685, [2012] 3
S.C.R. 34, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53 (S.C.C.) at paras. 35-36 [Cole] [citations & emphasis
omitted].
R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 2014 CarswellSask 342, 2014 CarswellSask 343, [2014] 2
S.C.R. 212, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43 (S.C.C.) at para 15 [Spencer].
Canada (Director of Investigation Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v. Southam
Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, 1984 CarswellAlta 415, (sub nom. Hunter v. Southam Inc.)
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.); R. v. Beare (1987), 1987 CarswellSask
674, 1987 CarswellSask 675, EYB 1987-67944, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, [1987] S.C.J. No. 92
(S.C.C.) [Beare cited to S.C.R.]; R. v. Debot, 1989 CarswellOnt 111, 1989 CarswellOnt
966, EYB 1989-67472, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118 (S.C.C.) [Debot cited to
S.C.R.]; Cloutier c. Langlois, 1990 CarswellQue 8, 1990 CarswellQue 110, EYB 199067780, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, [1990] S.C.J. No. 10 (S.C.C.) [Cloutier cited to S.C.R.]; R. v.
Caslake, 1998 CarswellMan 1, 1998 CarswellMan 2, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, [1998] S.C.J. No.
3 (S.C.C.).

176 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[13 C.J.L.T.]

At a minimum, pat-downs or frisks are acceptable behaviours by police.19 The
range of searches has extended to fingerprints and vehicle searches. 20 Conversely,
the scope of the SITA power is limited. Taking blood and performing strip
searches have been found as violations under certain contexts. 21 Taking hair
samples, teeth impressions, and buccal swabs have been found to ‘‘very seriously
violate[]. . .the. . .right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure” as well as
violate the section 7 right to security and principles of fundamental justice. 22
These cases, referenced by both the majority and the dissent in Fearon, are as
helpful as they are troubling: helpful by establishing a spectrum between classes
of searches seen as inherently ‘‘reasonable” and those seen as contravening
section 8 privacy interests; troubling because analogizing between fingerprints
and smartphones is risky business. The apparent desire to limit the scope of
potential searches suggests the spectrum does not cover immaterial data.
So where on the spectrum does a search of a cell phone’s contents fall? Where
does any technology-based infringement fall? Several cases have begun to set a
standard which may clarify the particular circumstances of Fearon.

(b) On Technological Issues in Lawful Arrests
Regarding technology, a number of cases have debated the spectrum of the
reasonable expectation of privacy. A thermal intrusion on a suspect’s dwelling
does not violate the reasonable expectation of privacy afforded by section 8, nor
does digital recording ammeter data (a device which measures electrical power
flowing into a residence).23 In R. v. Spencer the Court defended section 8 in light
of police requests for IP address information through PIPEDA, stating:
Since [in this case] the police do not have the power to conduct a search
for subscriber information in the absence of exigent circumstances or a
reasonable law, I do not see how they could gain a new search power
through the combination of a declaratory provision and a provision
enacted to promote the protection of personal information.24
19
20

21

22
23

24

Cloutier, supra note 18 at paras 60-65; Debot, supra note 18 at paras 78-79.
Beare, supra note 18 at para 22; R. v. Stillman, 1997 CarswellNB 107, 1997 CarswellNB
108, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34 (S.C.C.) at para 128 [Stillman]; R. v. Nolet,
2010 SCC 24, 2010 CarswellSask 368, 2010 CarswellSask 369, EYB 2010-175730, [2010]
1 S.C.R. 851, [2010] S.C.J. No. 24 (S.C.C.) at paras. 42-54.
R. v. Dyment, 1988 CarswellPEI 7, 1988 CarswellPEI 73, EYB 1988-67715, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 417, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82 (S.C.C.) [Dyment]; R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, 2001
CarswellOnt 4301, 2001 CarswellOnt 4253, REJB 2001-27031, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679,
[2001] S.C.J. No. 81 (S.C.C.).
Stillman, supra note 20 at paras 48-51.
R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351, 2004 CarswellOnt 4352, REJB
2004-72161, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63 (S.C.C.) at paras. 63-64; R. v.
Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, 2010 CarswellAlta 2269, 2010 CarswellAlta 2270, [2010] 3 S.C.R.
211, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55 (S.C.C.) at paras. 41, 95.
Spencer, supra note 17 at para 73.
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Unfortunately, these cases did not involve a lawful arrest—otherwise they
could have provided more guidance for following SITA protocol for electronic
devices.
The Ontario Superior Court in R. v. Polius recommended cell phone-specific
SITA-related privacy expectations. In that case, the suspect was arrested
lawfully.25 The contents of his phone were exhaustively examined without
warrant for three days.26 The Court ruled that the arresting officer had
reasonable grounds to search the accused’s phone based on witness testimony
alleging the suspect had communicated to a murder accomplice regarding the
victim. The Court stated outright that ‘‘the power to seize a cell phone during a
SITA where there is reason to believe it may afford evidence of the crime does
not include a power to examine the contents of the cell phone without a prior
judicial authorization, absent exigent circumstances.”27 The Supreme Court in
Fearon found the judgment in Polius unpersuasive.

(c) On the Most Profound Invasions of Privacy
The Supreme Court spoke at length on the nature of computer searches in R.
v. Morelli, where Justice Fish suggested that searches of personal computers
might be the most intrusive invasions of privacy. Morelli is not a case of SITA,
but an information to obtain a search warrant (ITO). However, Justice Fish
expressed the Court’s majority opinion on any section 8 breach involving a
computer, stating: ‘‘[i]t is therefore difficult to conceive a s. 8 breach with a
greater impact on the Charter-protected privacy interests of the accused than
occurred in this case.”28
Given the comprehensive jurisprudential views on section 8 breaches and
technology, it is surprising that the majority in Fearon could:
1. Admit the similarities between smartphones and personal computers;
2. Suggest that all phones, smart or dumb, are to be treated alike; and
3. Develop and apply a test which gives police the low-threshold power to
commit a warrantless breach of section 8 protection on any lawful arrest.

III. THE MAJORITY’S TECHNOLOGICAL MISSTEPS
(a) Failure to Analogize to Computers
The majority overlooked prior pertinent Supreme Court of Canada
discussions of Canadians’ reasonable expectations of privacy pertaining to
electronic devices. In R. v. Vu, Justice Cromwell himself delivered a judgment
expressing strong sentiments about how computers create information without
25
26
27
28

R. v. Polius, 2009 CarswellOnt 4213, [2009] O.J. No. 3074 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para 18 [Polius].
Ibid at para 23.
Ibid at para 32.
Morelli, supra note 1 at para 106.
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users’ knowledge and retain information users try to erase. In criminal
investigations, ‘‘[this information can] enable investigators to access intimate
details about a user’s interests, habits, and identity, drawing on a record that the
user created unwittingly.”29
The existing implications of privacy over the contents of computers discussed
in cases like Vu, Spencer, and Morelli should extend to privacy over the contents
of smartphones. All smartphones can store immense amounts of auto-generated
data unbeknownst to the user, and usually feature cross-platform capabilities:
files on personal computers are uploaded to the cloud, then synchronized with
the phone.30 At a minimum, the smartphone can be considered an extension or
peripheral device of the computer, housing the same browsing history, cached
files, and correspondence—in addition to being the user’s primary
communication device and camera. Therefore, if case law suggests laptop
searches are significant intrusions of privacy, phone searches are equal if not
greater intrusions.
Smartphones are not mere analogues of computers. We do not frequently
take photographs or make private calls using laptops. We rarely immediately
share our photos and videos using personal computers, broadcasting our
location to our social network or the world. The portability and versatility of our
pocket-sized, GPS-equipped, always-on mobile devices create a window to
intimate personal details which the Supreme Court has confirmed Canadians
have a right to withhold from state agents.31
Based on Justice Fish’s prior commentary, it should have followed that the
Supreme Court would agree that if smartphones are at least analogous to
computers, they accordingly demand as high a level of reasonable privacy
expectations as in a search of a suspect’s dwellings. The majority even
acknowledged smartphones as ‘‘the functional equivalent of computers” but
then distinguished them, suggesting ‘‘not every search is inevitably a significant
intrusion.”32 It is unclear why they asserted this despite having established
numerous times in prior jurisprudence that high expectations are found to exist
in the context of informational privacy.33 It is possible this illogical conclusion
derived from their choice to not differentiate between generations of phones.

29
30

31

32
33

Vu, supra note 2 at para 42.
Brian X. Chen, Always On: How the iPhone Unlocked the Anything-Anytime-Anywhere
Future—and Locked Us In (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2012) at 130-143.
R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, 1993 CarswellAlta 566, EYB 1993-66899, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 281, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97 (S.C.C.) at para 27.
Fearon, supra note 3 at para 54.
E. Michael Power, The Law of Privacy (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2013) at
245.
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(b) All Phones Are One in the Eyes of the Law
On facts of this case, the majority could have arrived at a more reasonable
conclusion based on the differences between smartphones (used for
communication, computing, and data storage) and disposable ‘‘dumbphones”
(including the cheap prepaid ‘‘burner phones” typically used for the nefarious
purposes expressed by the majority’s discussion of valid police objectives). 34
Stating that they ‘‘should not differentiate among different cellular devices based
on their particular capacities when setting the general framework for the search
power,” the majority missed an opportunity to distinguish sophisticated
smartphones from burners, which have limited features, are more difficult to
trace, and provide an inexpensive method of regularly changing phone
numbers.35
Making that distinction might have worked with the facts of Fearon—more
importantly, it would have acknowledged the rapidly evolving technological
environment to which the law should aim to adapt. Fearon’s phone is described
in the trial court judgment as a Telus LG285, a discontinued flip phone within
the ‘‘burner” class of devices, lacking a touchscreen, high-resolution camera, and
social media application capabilities.36 To suggest that this phone bears any
similarity to an iPhone 6 is akin to comparing a MacBook Air to a Commodore
64. Smartphones and dumbphones are too distinct to bear any categorical
similarities besides the capacity for emailing, photographing, and making and
receiving calls. The majority’s refusal to differentiate between the two is
meritless.
Marking the appropriate legal boundary between classes of phones is not a
simple task for the courts, and the technological insight required to do so may be
better left to legislation.37 Nevertheless, declaring that no line should be drawn,
ostensibly grouping all mobile devices together, posits an unrealistically static
determination of innovation. Assuredly, the constantly evolving nature of
technology will continuously distance the resemblance between powerful ‘‘‘minicomputer[s]’” and their predecessors.38
The dynamic nature of technological evolution in smartphones contributes
to the majority’s miscalculation of the efficacy that a power to perform cursory
searches of ‘‘burner” phones incident to arrest might yield. The LG285 and
34
35

36
37
38

Fearon, supra note 3 at para 52.
Nate Anderson, ‘‘Times Square bombing suspect used a ‘burner’ phone,” Ars Technica (5
May 2010), online: <arstechnica.com>; Justin Peters, ‘‘Can Disposable ‘Burner’
Cellphones Protect You from Government Surveillance?” (27 June 2013), Slate: Crime
(blog), online: <www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013/06/07/verizon_nsa_scandal_can_disposable_
burner_cell_phones_protect_you_from_government.html>.
Fearon C.J., supra note 4 at para 19.
Savard & McConchie, supra note 8; Fearon, supra note 3 at para 84.
Fearon C.J., supra note 4 at para 49.
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similarly-low-quality cell models lack high-resolution cameras and user-friendly
touchscreens and are ill-suited to capture and store intimate photographs and
videos. They are less compatible with modern and fully updated social media
applications like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, or even Gmail, all of which are
veritable warehouses of intimate personal details. However, these phones might
indeed exclusively contain crucial recent communications and (low-resolution)
photographs which may—as the Fearon test seeks—help protect the police, the
accused, or the public, or help to locate additional suspects.
Marking a legal boundary that allows the search of older technology, but not
newer, incident to arrest may admittedly be difficult to administer in practice.
Barring an exhaustive list of acceptable searchable devices, law enforcement
officials would still have to make a judgment call. And, even if a particular phone
were included on such a list of accepted phones, there may be reason to conclude
that a device might contain more sensitive personal information than usual.
Older phones may be improved by connecting external storage devices, making
network upgrades, and making internal upgrades to its mechanisms which allow
the user to record activity that the phone would not normally record.39 Despite
the difficulty in differentiating between the two, there is merit in the
understanding that smartphones and flip phones can be as technologically
distinct as flip phones and rotary phones.

(c) No Such Thing as a Pinpointed Smartphone Search
Finally, the language in the Fearon test fails to take the nature of smartphone
data and police procedure into account, and does not function without a
significant section 8 intrusion. The doctrine of exigent circumstances, as defined
in the Criminal Code, uses the word ‘‘imminent” carefully when referring to harm
to individuals or evidence.40 In steps (1) and (2) of the modified test, a search is
justifiable if there is a reason—any reason—to conduct a search based on the
valid law enforcement objectives listed. Even before reaching steps (3) and (4), it
is obvious the police will have no difficulty finding reasons to justify their
actions, particularly where step (2)(c) is concerned. 41
Moreover, there is a logical fallacy: a cursory search to discover evidence
cannot be tailored to its purpose, as set out in step (3). Unless law enforcement
has been given precise testimony as to where in a device discoverable evidence
can be found, an indefinite search through data will have to be made. Even if
police received a tip that photographic evidence existed on a phone, its location
would be a mystery. Would it be in Instagram, a photo sharing application, or is
it a hidden on the SD card? If the evidence is a text message, is it in a common
39
40
41

Savard & McConchie, supra note 8.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 529.3(2).
Fearon, supra note 3 at para 83: ‘‘[d]iscovering evidence, including locating additional
suspects, in situations in which the investigation will be stymied or significantly
hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest.”
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messaging platform like WhatsApp, or encrypted inside TextSecure? The only
way a pinpoint cursory search would purely allow the search of the specific
information sought would be if details were available to the police beyond a
reasonable margin of error. Otherwise, any search attempt becomes highly
invasive, uncovering a great deal of information beyond the scope allotted. 42
This is true even for searches granted by warrants: where exigent circumstances
demand urgent action on a lawful arrest, there is no doubt that law enforcement
is at a high risk of infringing privacy despite the modified test’s attempt to limit
that risk.
Furthermore, steps (2) and (3) together allow a near limitless search through
the phone. In cases where evidence is discovered after an exhaustive search, it
could be retroactively justified if law enforcement can reasonably say it would
have stymied the investigation—‘‘stymied” not being a high threshold. The
majority has listed several concerns as to why smartphone searches have the
potential to be significant intrusions, and in step (3) they effectively give licence
to the police to search a phone until they find something with which to
incriminate the suspect and additional suspects.43 This is an unacceptable
intrusion on section 8 rights, defeating the Charter’s purpose, as Justice La
Forest expressed best in R. v. Dyment:
[I]f the privacy of the individual is to be protected, we cannot afford to
wait to vindicate it only after it has been violated. . ..Invasions of
privacy must be prevented, and where privacy is outweighed by other
societal claims, there must be clear rules setting forth the conditions in
which it can be violated. This is especially true of law enforcement,
which involves the freedom of the subject.44

IV. DO THESE MISSTEPS RENDER THE TEST INFEASIBLE IN
PRACTICE?
(a) Serving Valid Law Enforcement Objectives
Given the Fearon test’s flaws, how might a cell phone search incident to an
arrest operate? The first two conditions of a SITA of a cell phone—that the
arrest must have been lawful and that the search must have been truly incidental
to that arrest—would yield familiar results, as courts have previously relied on
similar requirements.45

42

43

44
45

Orin S. Kerr, ‘‘Searches and Seizures in a Digital World” (2005) 119:2 Harv L. Rev 531 at
566.
Frank Addario & Andrew Burgess, ‘‘If You Don’t Care about Privacy, Why Are You
Wearing Pants?” (2015) 35:5 For the Defence.
Dyment, supra note 21 at para 23.
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However, the third law enforcement purpose—discovering evidence in
situations where, absent the search, the investigation will be stymied or
significantly hampered—is novel, and has already been followed in two recent
cases. One Court recently held that searching incoming and outgoing text
messages to discover evidence of previous drug selling, the identity of potential
buyers, and other information constituted a valid law enforcement purpose
under the modified Fearon test.46 A month later, another decision held that a
cursory review of recent texts on a cell phone, seized after stopping a car driven
by two teenagers suspected of drug dealing, was incidental to a lawful arrest. 47
Despite, in both cases, there being neither concern for nor discussion of a risk
of immediate harm to any person or evidence, the Courts had little difficulty
finding that the examinations of those cell phones would recover ‘‘relevant
information towards the purchase and sale of drugs.” Thus, without such an
immediate examination, the investigation would have been stymied. 48
These decisions epitomize the low-threshold of ‘‘stymied.” If a cell phone
present at the scene of a suspected drug deal might contain evidence of drug
dealing communications, then it stands to reason that logic would apply to any
suspected criminal activity that requires planning or communication to execute.
Unlike the prior high-threshold requirement that only urgent circumstances
dictate whether a SITA is justifiable, the modified test indicates that the mere
premeditated nature of the crime for which an arrest is made will allow a SITA of
a cell phone.

(b) Taking Notes
In addition to the problematic supplement to the Fearon test’s standard list
of acceptable law enforcement purposes, two unique conditions—that the nature
and the extent of the search are tailored to the purpose of the search, and that the
police must take detailed notes—pose practical complications.
The limitations of nature and extent were explained by the majority as
meaning that ‘‘only recently sent or drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log
may be examined.”49 In theory, the limitation has virtue; in practice, it is
infeasible. Modern smartphones do not come equipped with filters that can
effectively isolate the items listed. In standard Android and Apple text messaging
applications, recently received texts may be sorted chronologically, but the most
recently sent text communications are not ordered by default, and will not be
instantly discernible to a new handler of the device. Justice Karakatsanis’ dissent
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articulates this difficulty of performing a ‘‘meaningfully constrained targeted or
cursory inspection of a cell phone or other personal digital device.” 50
The note-taking requirement, too, is likely to breed confusion. First, there is
a matter of accuracy and detail, as note-taking often occurs after the search. 51
Further, in cases where a SITA is necessary under time-sensitive circumstances,
such as a risk of harm or destruction of evidence, it is unreasonable to expect
perfectly accurate and detailed notes. If the very concept of note-taking is
susceptible to inaccuracies due to postponed transcription, what use will they be
to either the Crown or plaintiff in litigation or judicial review?

V. WHY THE MAJORITY’S MISSTEPS ENDANGER CANADIANS’
FREEDOMS
The modification of a new common law test for smartphone SITAs poses a
critical threat to Canadians’ freedom, with minimal recognizable offerings of
guidance to police investigating criminal activity. And, as Justice Cromwell
himself expressed in detail in Vu, the potential downsides are numerous,
unnecessarily creating wider avenues to wrongful convictions and raising
unexpected Charter infringements beyond section 8.
There is no debate concerning the need to minimize risk of wrongful
convictions. The Supreme Court has recently acknowledged a number of public
inquiries highlighting the importance of safeguarding the criminal justice
system—and protecting the accused tried under it—from the possibility of
wrongful conviction.52 The Fearon test opens a door for the acquisition and
admissibility of ambiguous evidence which may be used to impeach a suspect’s
credibility or even incriminate him. There is a good reason why access to this
kind of evidence has to date been afforded protection: the potential to unfairly
prejudice the accused in criminal proceedings.
For example, the US case of Gilberto Valle represents a perilous trend
toward prosecuting ‘‘thought crime.” Valle, who fantasized online about killing
and eating various women, was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to commit
kidnap—but no real-world, offline steps were taken to kidnap anyone.53 The jury
could not see beyond Valle’s repulsive fantastical tastes, holding the belief that he
had committed the actus reus elements beyond a reasonable doubt.54 (The verdict
was overturned.) This case is highly characteristic of the potential for our private
data to portray us unfairly and hinder our freedom of expression, precisely as
Justice Cromwell warned in Vu.55 Whether Valle planned to actually eat his wife,
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Americans and Canadians are guaranteed the freedom to think and to express
those thoughts regardless of their repugnancy. Section 2(b) of the Charter
protects us from being held culpable by the state for what is inside our minds, but
the Fearon test gives law enforcement access to data which may paint an
inaccurate picture of our minds.
In addition to infringing on freedom of expression, broader discretion for
police to access our phones may also be said to have an inherently infringing
effect on our section 7 protection of liberty as a matter of expanding state
surveillance. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s development of the infamous
Panopticon prison postulated the theory that people who believe they are
being watched will act in a manner vastly more conformist and compliant. 56 The
belief that law enforcement may at any time, without reasonable grounds, search
through our personal data would cripple any propensity to engage in deviant
behaviour regardless of its illegality.57 Who would input anything questionable
into a Google search knowing that it may someday be employed against them as
impeaching evidence?
While the collection and permanence of our Internet activity is altogether
another matter, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that records of virtual
behaviour, recorded unbeknownst to the user, can be accessed via the
smartphone hard drive.58 Combining our online histories with GPS and
fingerprint/retina-scanning technology makes smartphones very appealing
sources of evidence for law enforcement, but will also serve to render certain
legal behavioural choices off-limits.59 As our electronic devices increasingly act
as windows to our innermost personal details, there must be careful limitations to
how data is searched, recorded, and exploited in criminal proceedings. Justice
Cromwell acknowledged this in Vu, stating ‘‘[t]he purpose of the prior
authorization process is thus to balance the privacy interest of the individual
against the interest of the state in investigating criminal activity before the state
intrusion occurs.”60
There are few shortcomings to the existing law enforcement power for
searching suspects on arrest. If, as in Fearon, officers want to access data on a
suspect’s phone in a lawful SITA scenario, there are a number of ways they can
justifiably do so. The most well established method does not require detailed
analysis: there is a lower threshold to seize a device upon lawful arrest when there
are reasonable grounds to do so, because there is no heightened privacy
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interest.61 Following a seizure, a warrant can be obtained allowing lawful access
to search the contents. While patience is required, this process serves police
objectives to search data fully, if not promptly, for their purposes.
Unquestionably, situations arise where objectives may only be sufficiently
met through swiftness. There are two established safeguards providing ample
assistance where speed is required:
1. The doctrine of exigent circumstances is cited by both the majority and
dissent (the former vaguely explained its flaws while the latter praised its
suitability); and
2. The Waterfield doctrine has been used sparingly, but effectively, to fill
gaps where dire situations have required the police to expand their powers
beyond the standard admissible range.

VI. EXISTING LAW ENFORCEMENT POWER
(a) Exigent Circumstances
The doctrine of exigent circumstances is an unambiguous tool law
enforcement may use when dire conditions suggest the necessity of a search
upon lawful arrest which goes beyond the permissible cursory depth. The
Criminal Code outlines the powers of police in the circumstances of Fearon, and
jurisprudence has expanded upon this by acknowledging several bases on which
the doctrine may rely.62The first concerns imminent loss or destruction of
evidence; the second includes a concern for public or police safety. In R. v. Kelsy,
the Ontario Court of Appeal succinctly explained the need to rely on exigent
circumstances, stating:
[W]hether. . .invoked to search for evidence or to protect the public or
for officer safety, it is the nature of the exigent circumstances that
makes some less intrusive investigatory procedure insufficient. By their
nature, exigent circumstances are extraordinary and should be invoked
to justify violation of a person’s privacy only where necessary.63

Especially in Fearon, where a violent crime involving a firearm was
committed, the doctrine accordingly afforded the police the capacity to seize a
phone if they had reasonable grounds to believe its contents related to the offence
committed.
Justice Karakatsanis’ dissent stressed the importance of reasonable grounds
under exigent circumstances.64 Without grounds to search a phone, the urgency
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necessary to invoke the doctrine is not present. This is a logical limit, as law
enforcement agents could otherwise justify any warrantless search by saying ‘‘we
might have found something of use.” It would be trite to say that giving police a
groundless power to search unacceptably intrudes on Canadians’ privacy
rights.65
Yet, one can imagine circumstances the majority might have considered
when it felt compelled to expand the common law test for smartphone searches.
For example: a child is abducted, a suspect is lawfully detained, police have
seized the suspect’s smartphone on cursory search with an ITO, and the child’s
location is unknown. One may argue there is no immediate danger to the public
or police. If the facts do not display reasonable grounds to suggest the presence
of evidence relating to the kidnapping on the phone, nor the imminent danger of
the destruction of that evidence, would this situation not demand immediate
action? In light of this concern, there is a potential legal solution: the Waterfield
test.

(b) Waterfield
The Waterfield doctrine developed from an English Court of Appeals case
which employed a two stage test to determine whether the police had acted
within their professional obligations, in order to validate a charge of assault
against an officer in the course of executing his duties.66 The Waterfield test was
integrated into Canadian jurisprudence, and transformed by the Supreme Court
of Canada into an ancillary police powers test that could justify new common
law conduct which might otherwise fall outside the spectrum of statute-imposed
police conduct, such as exigent circumstances.
The test is a balancing act to determine whether police conduct ‘‘(a). . .falls
within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or recognised at
common law and (b) whether [it], albeit within the general scope of such a duty,
involved an unjustifiable use of powers associated with the duty.”67 For the
infringement to be justified, the police action must meet a ‘‘reasonably
necessary” standard.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized limits to Waterfield and
directed courts to further consider three factors when justifying police powers 68:
1. The importance of the performance of the duty to the public good69;
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2. The necessity of the interference with individual liberty for the performance of the duty70; and
3. The extent of the interference with individual liberty. 71
The common law and legislation have both strived to give the police as much
power as possible to preserve the peace and administer justice, while carefully
acknowledging that law enforcement’s power should not be unlimited. 72 Even if
the preservation of evidence or the safety of the public or police is not at stake,
the Waterfield test may justify a search which infringes on privacy rights based
on the totality of the circumstances.73
The trend of using the test to create common law power is not without
controversy. In the first Canadian case to employ Waterfield, Chief Justice
Dickson’s powerful dissent criticized the majority judgement’s law-making role
and implied that invoking the ancillary powers test was a danger to civil liberties
and would erode the rule of law.74 Yet, in the 30 years since Dedman, the
Supreme Court has shown itself willing to adopt the doctrine in a handful of
cases.
A major complaint from commentators concerns the use of Waterfield to
sidestep legislation, and in the process extend police power thereby increasing the
potential for unjustified law enforcement overreach.75 This criticism is powerful,
and as the Supreme Court might be developing distaste for Waterfield in this
context, it would be imprudent to advocate for the ancillary powers doctrine as a
comprehensive alternative solution.76 Yet, similar criticism—that deployment of
ambiguous judicial guidance may precipitate abuses of power—equally suits the
Fearon test. Thus, while invoking Waterfield to justify a cursory search of a cell
phone may not be superior to clear unambiguous legislation defining the scope of
police conduct, it would at least be preferable to granting a low-threshold licence
for law enforcement to infringe Canadians’ privacy on arrest provided they later
take detailed notes.
In the above kidnapping hypothetical—presuming the conduct passes the
first stage of the Waterfield test—the Supreme Court would likely find that a
cursory cell phone search of a suspected and lawfully detained kidnapper passes
69
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muster of MacDonald’s three considerations. In such a case, a court would not be
using the status of the arrestee (e.g., phone ownership) to define the scope of
police power to carry out cursory phone searches on arrest. Rather, it would
recognize the context and needs of the specific circumstances (e.g., a kidnapping)
to justify police conduct which infringes Canadians’ section 8 rights. 77 The
retroactive approach of Waterfield is not ideal, yet it is preferable to the Fearon
test in terms of minimizing the potential for privacy infringement.

CONCLUSION
Considering the numerous conditions from which an arrest can lead to a
tolerable search of smartphone data, cursory searches must endure as a legal safe
zone. Protecting smartphones from warrantless SITAs (barring exigent
circumstances or reasonable necessity in line with Waterfield) accords with
common law privacy interest protection. The Supreme Court has spoken at
length about profound infringements in SITA scenarios. It has repeatedly agreed
that, despite the need for police powers, it is supposed to be difficult for the
police to invade one’s privacy.
The fear that law enforcement may become powerless to procure valuable
evidence to indict criminals whose guilt appears assured is undoubtedly a
compelling reason to allow the police to search suspects’ cell phones. But to
balance vital Charter rights with the administration of justice, any changes to the
powers of law enforcement demand a careful strategy which is lacking in the
majority, but notably present in the dissent.
Two realities are evident in Justice Karakatsanis’ dissent. Firstly, despite the
majority’s attempt in Fearon to address alleged deficiencies in the administration
of justice process, no deficiency truly exists where law enforcement wishes to
search a cell phone.78 Either there are reasonable grounds to invoke the doctrine
of exigent circumstances, or a search is prima facie unreasonable. Growing
technological concerns simply do not create new legal powers to authorize
warrantless searches of the form and content of electronic devices.
Secondly, and more importantly, the majority never raises the point that the
privacy rights guaranteed by section 8 are not device-based, but data-based. 79 In
Cole, the Court expressly stated that ‘‘the subject matter of the alleged search is
the data, or informational content of the laptop’s hard drive, its mirror image,
and the Internet files disc—not the devices themselves.” 80 As Justice
Karakatsanis outlines, a distinction between data and device interests would
have helped improve the majority’s understanding of the perceived deficiency of
the test they have proclaimed. (Alarmingly, the majority only uses the word
‘‘data” once, compared to the dissent’s seven.)
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A likelihood of discovering evidence may be too low of a threshold to
demand a search of data under exigent circumstances, but that evidence might be
destroyed is generally a reasonable basis for seizing a device. As Justice
Karakatsanis points out, ‘‘[t]he police may usually seize a phone incident to
arrest in order to preserve the evidence, but will require a warrant before they can
search its contents.” 81 If the police can search a phone when urgent
circumstances demand it, or they can seize it and then seek a search warrant,
what does the majority’s test accomplish in either improving clarity for law
enforcement or protecting our Charter privacy interests?
In Fearon, the majority should not have granted the police the unprecedented
power to search suspects’ cell phones as they have done—though they are correct
that legislation may be desirable to meet similar apprehensions of deficiencies, in
order to improve the functionality of law enforcement. The existing law demands
a protection of privacy rights where smartphone data is concerned. The doctrine
of exigent circumstances gives law enforcement the power, when needed, to
balance privacy interests with the urgent need for security, and protection and/or
discovery of evidence, based on reasonable grounds. More protection of evidence
exists in the low-threshold reasonable basis test to seize data storage devices.
Future cases adjudicating the search of cell phones, particularly
smartphones, should distinguish R. v. Fearon for these reasons, and recognize
the sensible and thoughtful dissent of Justice Karakatsanis. This would lead to
an appropriate balance of Charter privacy protection with the valid law
enforcement objectives the majority sought (but failed) to guide in Fearon.
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